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The article explores Freud’s writing on homosexuality, from his early hypoth-
eses, expressed in his letters to Fleiss to his last observations in The Outline
of Psychoanalysis, published in 1940 after his death. We trace the continuities
as well as changes in his thinking, and have organized the paper conceptually,
under the headings: 1) Bisexuality 2) Narcissism and Object choice, 3) On
Normality and Pathology, and 4) The Quantitative factor and Aggression.
We show that Freud was the first to confirm the existence of homosexualities,
that he offers no black and white solution to the question of normality and
pathology, although he contributes to the understanding of the vehemence that
surrounds the subject, and that, in the considerable body of work, he has
offered a rich and varied foundation for further thinking on the subject.
Keywords: homosexuality, bisexuality, narcissism, normality, identification, aggression
Overall, what we have taken away from an exploration of Freud’s thinking
about homosexuality is a profound sense of the complexity of his attitudes,
his sometimes contradictory stance as he locates homosexuality within an
ever-widening, but also changing and developing, theoretical frame. There is
indeed too much: too much to pin down, to simplify, to find a rule of thumb.
As Freud’s interests change and develop over a lifetime of revolutionary
intellectual and clinical pursuits, the subject of homosexuality appears fre-
quently in his writing, informing and reflexively being informed by different
discoveries, different clinical problems. From the seminal and key discussion
of the nature of sexual development, specifically the role of infantile sexuality
in the construction of adult sexuality (1905), to the role of narcissism in
directing object choice (1910), to the nature of oedipal identifications in the
structuring of the psyche, the subject of the Ego and the Id (1923), to the nat-
ure of female sexuality (1931), to the contribution of aggression in the con-
flict between bisexual trends within the personality (1937, 1930), the ground
shifts from which the subject is observed, light is thrown from different direc-
tions. And even when with some certainty he identifies a pattern in a number
of homosexual developmental histories, he frequently offers a disclaimer, this
is but one trend, one process he has noted.
Yet Freud generally remains true to the position taken in 1905, that every
form of adult human sexuality is the product of a complex evolution, devel-
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oping over time, beginning in earliest infancy, in the first relation with the
mother, the first seducer. The understanding of the potential for complexity
in this wide frame is made richer, deeper, more certain over the years of
study, and at the same time, the large body of work contains a sense of lim-
its, not only is there much more to learn from a psychoanalytic perspective,
there are limits to psychoanalytic understanding. Popular culture and com-
mon sense, against which Freud posed the Three Essays (1905), cannot be
escaped. As in his discussion of feminism, feminine sexuality, Freud is not
immune from betraying a vernacular prejudice in his writing, although, in
relation to homosexuality, he is often at pains to identify it, illuminate it,
and distance himself from it. In principle, he takes a distanced and non-
judgmental position, however much he is aware of the fact that the subject
is coloured always by social attitudes, the cultural life which is always
informing the researcher and his subject. What follows is an endeavour to
capture the variety of views Freud puts forward about homosexuality, with
specific attention both to the constancies and to the contradictions. The
paper is divided into four sections, the first, on bisexuality, the second, on
narcissism, object choice and identification, the third, on the question of
normality and pathology, and the fourth, on the quantitative factor and
aggression. We hope to have organized his thinking, conceptually and his-
torically, in a way that is illuminating, at the same time, cautionary.
On bisexuality
The most significant relevant consistency in Freud’s thinking about homo-
sexuality lies in the assumption, never proven or very thoroughly explained,
that every individual is endowed with an innate bisexuality which is both
biological and psychological in its foundations. As stated in 1925, as well as
earlier (Freud, 1905, pp. 143–144) this bisexuality is related to homosexual-
ity: “homosexuality can be traced back to the constitutional bisexuality of
all human beings” (Freud, 1925b, p. 38). Homosexuality develops, but
bisexuality, in all its ambiguity, is bedrock. From the Fliess papers to Anal-
ysis Terminable and Interminable (Freud, 1937) bisexuality recurs, with
emphasis on psychological or physical manifestations, but usually implicitly
both. It is Fliess who originally asserted the notion, and the notion consti-
tutes a lasting legacy of this early, formative intellectual friendship. In 1896
Freud wrote in a letter to his intellectual confidant, as he puzzled over what
he understood to be different responses to premature sexual experience, “I
avail myself of the bisexuality of all human beings” (Freud, 1950, p. 238).
That is to say, he availed himself, or in an alternative translation from the
German, he ‘helped’ himself to Fliess’s theory, which remained on the plate
for the duration of his life. At the time of this first appropriation, he was
writing to Fliess about what he deemed to be the consequence, perverse or
neurotic, of premature sexual experience. He identified perverse in this con-
text as the compulsive enactment of pleasure seeking, here associated with
masculinity, whereas neurotic inhibition, in this context, is identified as
feminine. In this early affirmation of bisexuality he is linking different
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psychological attributes with bisexual potentiality, masculinity regarded as
active, femininity as passive. Interestingly, in this early discussion, pure fem-
inine or pure masculine orientations are treated as arbitrary constructions.
He will explicitly affirm this much later, in ‘Some Psychical Consequences
of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes’ (1925a) when he states
that “all human individuals, as a result of their bisexual disposition and of
cross-inheritance, combine in themselves both masculine and feminine char-
acteristics, so that pure masculinity and femininity remain theoretical con-
structions of uncertain content”. (Freud, 1925a, p. 258).
Three years after availing himself of Fliess’s theory, he wrote in a more
convinced and less speculative way, again in a letter to Fliess, “Bisexuality!
I am sure you are right about it. And I am accustoming myself to regarding
every sexual act as an event between four individuals” (Letter 113 of August
1, 1899 in Masson, 1985, p. 364). The emphasis here is more visceral and
specifically sexual, articulating the double orientation of every individual,
and by invoking the reference to individuals, implying that there is almost
the equivalent of a complete male and female ‘individual’ within each per-
son. Many years later this conceptualization will be central to his under-
standing of the Oedipus complex and the identifications with male and
female which are its product, most significantly in 1923, in The Ego and the
Id. By then, he has become more knowledgeable about the complexities of
identification. But as early as 1905, he wrote that “since I have become
acquainted with the notion of bisexuality I have regarded it as the decisive
factor, and without taking bisexuality into account I think it would scarcely
be possible to arrive at an understanding of the sexual manifestations that
are actually to be observed in men and women” (1905, p. 220).
The concept of bisexuality is not limited in its application to our specific
concern with the subject of homosexuality. But bisexuality is always present
when homosexuality is considered. Freud postulates in 1905 in the Three
Essays: “a bisexual disposition is somehow concerned in inversion, though
we do not know in what that disposition consists, beyond anatomical struc-
ture” (1905, p. 143). As he goes on to explore manifestations of homosexu-
ality, he considers the case of male homosexuals who are masculine, in that
they “retain the mental quality of masculinity”, but seek in their objects
feminine attributes, like the Greeks of the past. Here he notes a compro-
mise, “between an impulse that seeks for a man and one that seeks for a
woman, while it remains a paramount condition that the object’s body (i.e.
genitals) shall be masculine. Thus the sexual object is a kind of reflection of
the subject’s own bisexual nature” (the last sentence added in 1915) (1905,
p. 144).
Here, through the lens of bisexuality he has discovered an element of
heterosexuality in the homosexual object choice. In 1920, when he addresses
the possibility of a reversal of homosexual object choice in a patient, he
cautions against it, though recalls one case where analysis made access to
the opposite sex possible, the effect of which was to restore for the patient
his “full bisexual functions” (1920, p. 151). The ordinary, the normal, the
baseline from which a sexual identity and in most cases a preference
evolves, is bisexual. Bisexuality is the start of all sexuality, including homo-
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sexuality. And the attraction to a member of the same sex is universal,
though usually relegated to the unconscious, for a variety of reasons. But as
he writes when considering ‘The psychogenesis of a case of homosexuality’
in a woman, one must always “keep in mind the universal bisexuality of
human beings” (1920, p. 157). In the case of the young woman who is cen-
tral to this paper, he again shows the heterosexuality within a homosexual
object choice, in the choice of a masculine female object, disclosing again a
more subtle aspect of Freud’s use of the notion of bisexuality, here consid-
ering the sexual life of a homosexual. And here, as elsewhere, when consid-
ering a homosexual object choice, Freud’s conceptualization of bisexuality
proves as elusive as it is firmly confirmed.
It is not for psychoanalysis to solve the problem of homosexuality. It must rest
content with disclosing the psychical mechanisms that resulted in determining the
object-choice . . . psychoanalysis has a common basis with biology, in that it presup-
poses an original bisexuality in human beings (as in animals.) But psychoanalysis
cannot elucidate the intrinsic nature of what in conventional or in biological
phraseology is termed ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’. It simply takes over the two con-
cepts and makes them the foundation for its work. When we attempt to reduce
them further, we find masculinity vanishing into activity and femininity into passiv-
ity, and that does not tell us enough.
(1920, p. 171)
So the psychological dimension of bisexuality, asserted as firmly as the
biological, proves difficult to define.
It is in the Ego and the Id, in 1923, when the bisexuality of the individual
is shown to intertwine with the process of identification, and in particular
identification with lost objects of oedipal attachment, the internalization of
the parental couple and the elaboration of the super ego, that the notion of
bisexuality takes on a dynamic role. Describing the outcome of the oedipal
complex, he writes:
It would appear therefore, that in both sexes the relative strength of the masculine
and feminine sexual dispositions is what determines whether the outcome of the
Oedipus situation shall be an identification with the father or with the mother. This
is one of the ways in which bisexuality takes a hand in the subsequent vicissitudes
of the Oedipus complex. The other way is even more important. For one gets the
impression that the simple Oedipus complex is by no means its commonest form,
but rather represents a simplification or schematization which, to be sure, is often
enough justified for practical purposes. Closer study usually discloses the more
complete Oedipus complex, which is twofold, positive and negative, and is due to
the bisexuality originally present in children, that is to say, a boy has not merely an
ambivalent attitude towards his father and an affectionate object choice towards
his mother, but at the same time he also behaves like a girl and displays an affec-
tionate feminine attitude to his father and a corresponding jealousy and hostility
towards his mother. It is this complicating element introduced by bisexuality that
makes it so difficult to obtain a clear view of the facts in connection with the earli-
est object-choices and identifications, and still more difficult to describe them intel-
ligibly. It may even be that the ambivalence displayed in the relations to the
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parents should be attributed entirely to bisexuality and that it is not, as I have rep-
resented [earlier], developed out of identification in consequence of rivalry.
(1923, p. 34)
Finally, he will affirm that “The relative intensity of the two identifica-
tions in any individual will reflect the preponderance in him of one or other
of the two sexual dispositions.” Dispositions are innate, they are the bisexu-
ality with which each child is endowed or gifted (1923, p. 34) and which will
inform all the developmental steps the child takes, all the variations of
influence and accident in every individual history. The residue of hostility
linked to identifications developing out of the rivalries central to the oedipal
situation as understood in this seminal work will inform later preoccupa-
tions in relation to conflicted sexual identity but here, the bisexual nature of
any individual is identified as the fertile foundation for ambivalent sexual
identifications.
Freud will continue to affirm the importance of bisexuality after the cru-
cial integration with the structural model in 1923. He will also confirm,
again, and more explicitly, that along with the firmness of the commitment
to the ideal of the principle, bisexuality remained a shadowy concept. In
Civilization and its Discontents (1930) he wrote:
The theory of bisexuality is still surrounded by many obscurities and we cannot but
feel it as a serious impediment in psychoanalysis that it has not yet found any link
with the theory of the instincts. However this may be, if we assume it as a fact that
each individual seeks to satisfy both male and female wishes in his sexual life, we
are prepared for the possibility that those [two sets of demands] are not fulfilled by
the same object.
(1930, p. 106)
So this fundamental paradigm with which Freud grounds his thinking
about homosexuality, remains opaque theoretically, and scientifically spec-
ulative, however theoretically useful. It is, moreover, a great equalizer,
inasmuch as everyone is implicated in the bisexuality which plays a part
in any specific homosexual outcome to the development of a sexual
identity.
Narcissism and object choice, narcissism and identification
In the Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-year-old Boy, Freud wrote in 1909,
“There is absolutely no justification for distinguishing a special homosexual
instinct. What constitutes a homosexual is a peculiarity not in his instinctual
life but in his choice of an object” (1909, pp. 109–10). This is a firm and
unambiguous statement. In a footnote of 1915 added to the Three Essays
(1905) he states that “all human beings are capable of making a homosexual
object-choice and have in fact made one in their unconscious (1905, p. 145).
And in ‘Leonardo’ (Freud, 1910a) he asserts in a footnote added in 1919,
that this everyman or woman “either still adheres to [homosexual object
choice] in his unconscious or else protects himself against it by rigorous
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counter attitudes” (1910a, p. 99). The question of object choice is declared
with firmness, as the defining characteristic of homosexuality, but the dis-
tinction is also qualified, inasmuch as it is disclosed to be a choice made by
everyone, at least unconsciously. Something happens in development,
whereby ‘rigorous counter attitudes’ militate against the homosexual object
choice that at some time or another is understood to have occurred in
everyone’s erotic and emotional life. Such complication of certainties occurs
frequently in Freud’s discussion of homosexuality.
Although object choice remains a definitive element in identifying what is
essential to homosexuality, Freud later restates the relation of object choice
to homosexuality, in 1920 enlarging the field and distancing himself from
the singular definition he had reinforced in his own writing up to that time.
Significantly, when considering a female homosexual in ‘The Psychogenesis
of a case of Homosexuality in a Woman’ (1920) Freud states that homosex-
uality is a question of now three sets of characteristics, one of which is
object choice. The others have to do with physical characteristics “physical
hermaphroditism”, literally the possibility of one person bearing the physi-
cal attributes of both sexes, the most extreme being the possession of both
male and female genitals, and “mental sexual characters, or masculine or
feminine attitudes” linked to one or the other sex (1920, p. 170). These are
physical and psychical qualities which go beyond object choice, including
attitudes of mind and experiences of identity suggesting the qualities usually
gathered under the rubric of gender today. By 1920, object choice does not
stand alone as the defining characteristic of homosexuality, although it
remains central to the definition. By 1920, Freud is concerned with ques-
tions of identity.
A decisive turn in Freud’s thinking about homosexuality and the nature
of object choice came as he developed a theory of narcissism. Here he was
able to offer a dynamic psychological understanding of one path leading to
homosexual object choice, as well as homosexual identity. In a footnote
added in 1910 to the Three Essays (1905) he asserts,
future inverts, in the earliest years of their childhood, pass through a phase of very
intense but short lived fixation to a woman (usually their mother) and after leaving
this behind, they identify themselves with a woman and take themselves as their
sexual object. That is to say, they proceed from a narcissistic basis, and look for a
young man who resembles themselves and whom they may love as their mother
loved them.
(1905, p. 145)
This was the pattern discovered and elaborated in the long biographical
essay on Leonardo da Vinci. The boy child, illegitimate in Leonardo’s case,
alone with a mother Freud pictured to be abandoned by his father, is
“kissed by her into precocious sexual maturity” (Freud, 1910a, p. 131) the
“too early maturing of his eroticism [robbing] him of a part of his masculin-
ity” (1910a, p. 117). The mother in the hypothetical reconstruction elabo-
rated here is a phallic mother, a penetrating mother who informs the
phantasy expressed by Leonardo as an early memory, in which a vulture
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(or kite) is remembered by him to have come “down, and opened my mouth
with its tail, and struck me many times with its tail against my lips” (1910a,
p. 82). Sucking at the mother’s breast has become passive, ‘being suckled’,
and transformed into a passive homosexual phantasy. The eventual repres-
sion of this excited state of affairs facilitates the identification with the
mother, and it is this identification with the mother which becomes in
Freud’s reading the basis of the narcissistic object choices, in Leonardo’s
case, the young men who circulated in his studio and workshops, whom he
would love as his mother loved him.
In 1914, when he is exploring the subject of narcissism, Freud expands
the field, stating that a narcissistic “allocation of the libido might claim a
place in the regular course of human sexual development. Narcissism in this
sense would not be a perversion but the libidinal complement to the egoism
of the instinct of self-preservation, a measure of which may justifiably be
attributed to every living creature” (1914, p. 73). When Freud identifies nar-
cissism as the libidinal complement of the instinct of self-preservation, he
opens the way to considerations of how narcissistic vulnerability and the
possibility of life or death, eventually, anxiety about life or death, might
inform the development of sexual object choice, that is, lead to the narcis-
sistic object choice identified in this paper and elsewhere with homosexual
object choice.
In this paper he, again, characteristically tempers the generalization link-
ing homosexuality with narcissistic object choice immediately after assert-
ing it: “we have not concluded that human beings are divided into two
sharply differentiated groups, according as their object choice conforms to
the anaclitic or to the narcissistic type; we assume rather that both kinds
of object choice are open to each individual, though he may show a pref-
erence one to another” (1914, p. 88). The complexity again develops in
this picture, the illuminating generalization followed by a caution, a dis-
claimer, an insistence on keeping the question open, in line with the con-
sistent assertion of the complexity of his subject, here, the relationship
between homosexuality and narcissism. He continues, “we say that a
human being has originally two sexual objects – himself and the woman
who nurses him – and in doing so we are postulating a primary narcissism
in everyone, which may in some cases manifest itself in a dominating fash-
ion in his object choice” (1914, p. 88). He is here adding to the under-
standing of the factor located in the paper on Leonardo and expressed in
the footnote to the Three Essays, that the powerful immersion in the first
relationship with the mother is a potential foundation for the establish-
ment of a homosexual object choice. A too intense, overwhelming attach-
ment is maintained and yet ameliorated by taking as an object a lover
based on the self, while the subject identifies with the caring but over-
whelming and powerful mother.
Freud more often links the specific narcissistic anxiety associated with
sexual object choice with fears of castration. Writing in 1909 (of Little
Hans) but repeating the point later, In ‘Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Auto-
biographical Account of a Case of Paranoia’ (Freud, 1911) and in ‘Some
Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality’ (Freud,
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1922) he states that “owing to the erotogenic importance of their own geni-
tals, [homosexuals] cannot do without a similar feature in their sexual
object. In the course of their development from auto-eroticism to object
love, they have remained fixated at a point between the two – a point which
is closer to autoerotism” (1909, p. 109). ‘Erotogenic importance’ signals pri-
marily the importance of libidinal gratification. But castration anxiety and
autoerotism both can be linked to the narcissistic “egoism of self-preserva-
tion” (1914, p. 73), the issues of survival awakened in early object relations,
the threat of castration not only a threat to erotic object ties, but to narcis-
sistic integrity.
Homosexual object choice is one solution to the castration anxiety of the
male; the significance of castration in the erotic life of women is central to
Freud’s ideas about female development generally, with a specific reference
to female homosexuals. He notes the disparagement of women, “regarded
as castrated”, which informs some homosexual object choices in men, and
then he addresses the “effects of the castration complex in the female”. One
line of development, not the only one possible, “leads her to cling with defi-
ant self-assertiveness to her threatened masculinity. To an incredibly late
age she clings to the hope of getting a penis some time. That hope becomes
her life’s aim; and the phantasy of being a man in spite of everything often
persists as a formative factor over long periods.” This “masculinity com-
plex” in women can result in a manifest homosexual choice of object (1931,
pp. 229–230). Not, Freud asserts, that it necessarily does. The narcissistic
injury to women is seen here to emanate from the narcissistically driven dis-
paragement coming from narcissistically challenged men, as well as from
the woman’s own recognition of a lack. In his paper considering the homo-
sexual object choice of a young woman, he adds the narcissistic threat asso-
ciated with child bearing as another thread potentially driving a
homosexual object choice, a flight from the ‘disfigurement’ of maternity,
understood as a threat to bodily integrity (1920, p. 169).
In most of his considerations of narcissism and homosexual object choice,
Freud remains true to the theme of the Three Essays (Freud, 1905), in
which he shows a sexual development that starts in a primary relation with
a mother, and moves through phases of differentiation and development.
The primary relation to the mother gains emphasis, as explored with Leo-
nardo (1910a) where Freud observes that the homosexual object choice
understood as narcissistic, replicates and at the same time supports a sepa-
ration from a primary object loved with an intensity, a too muchness, which
in its intensity might be understood as a threat to self-preservation before it
becomes a threat to heterosexuality. When illuminating the paradox linking
the intense object love of earliest experience with a narcissistic homosexual
object choice, Freud, in characteristic fashion, acknowledges that this pro-
cess, ascribed to Leonardo and linked to other cases he has known, is
“perhaps only one among many, and is perhaps related to only one type of
‘homosexuality’” (1909, p. 101). Freud has opened the field, from homosex-
uality to that of homosexualities, a field entirely in keeping with the com-
plexities he has affirmed since the Three Essays of 1905.
940 S. Flanders et al
Int J Psychoanal (2016) 97 Copyright © 2016 Institute of Psychoanalysis
On normality and pathology
It follows that Freud does not offer unequivocal support for any firm
position in a debate about the normality or pathology of homosexuality,
although he acknowledges intermittently the cultural context in which this
debate, like his research, is situated. His commitment was, from the
beginning, to deepen understanding rather than take a position in a debate,
to which he nonetheless refers. In addressing the subject of sexuality, he
often makes reference to the social forces which influence and impinge on
the individual’s sexual development, and which impinge inevitably on any
study, any debate. He does not explicitly link this cultural context with the
super ego, which he might have done, following his own metapsychology, at
least after 1923. More often he seems to want to clear the way for science,
sometimes subtly making reference to the cultural context in which his
explorations are embedded, for example, through the use of quotations
when addressing the question of homosexuality, referring to “perverse” peo-
ple (1916–17, p. 304) or distancing himself yet more, referring to develop-
mental inhibitions, “described as perversion” one of which is homosexuality
(Freud, 1940, p. 155).
The results of his exploration from the time of the Three Essays (Freud,
1905) was to deconstruct common assumptions about normality, undermin-
ing any simple notion of normality and pathology, masculinity and feminin-
ity. The variety of sexual activity found in adult life, explored and
publicized by a number of researchers in the latter half of the 20th century
and elaborated by Freud in the first chapter of the Three Essays, were dis-
covered by Freud to originate in an infancy that is universally sexual, and
developmentally complex. Normality is in every instance disclosed to be an
intricate integration and compromise. A demand for a black and white posi-
tion, in relation to normality and pathology, implies a widespread resistance
to Freud’s fundamental position.
In the compendium called Aberrations, the first chapter in the Three
Essays, Freud calls homosexuality an “inversion”, not a perversion, using
here the less pejorative term introduced by Havelock Ellis, whose 1897
book was in fact entitled Inversion. The word invert and the conceptualiza-
tion of homosexuality as essentially related to the choice of object, not
anything specific in the drive, or aim, supports one of Freud’s key theoret-
ical positions, repeated throughout this relatively early work, repeated later
by him in different contexts, but first illustrated and explored in relation
to homosexuality. Homosexuality is an aid to his conceptualization of
instinct, or the drives, loosening a conventional assumption of the insepa-
rability of instinct and object. Its normality in childhood, as well as its
illustrative help in the deconstruction of the notion of instinct, or drives,
are repeated in a famous passage relating to Little Hans and referred to
earlier. Focusing on homosexuality as related to object choice rather than
instinct, Freud preserves for the instinct or drives an aspect of normality:
There is absolutely no justification for distinguishing a special homosexual instinct
What constitutes a homosexual is a peculiarity not in his instinctual life but in his
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choice of an object. Let me recall what I have said in my Three Essays to the effect
that we have mistakenly imagined the bond between instinct and object in sexual
life as being more intimate that it really is. A homosexual may have normal
instincts, but he is unable to disengage them from a class of objects defined by a
particular determinant. Hans was a homosexual (as all children may very well be),
quite consistently with the fact, which must always be kept in mind, that he was
acquainted with only one kind of genital organ – a genital organ like his own.
(1909, pp. 109–110)
In the Three Essays, he wrote:
Psychoanalytic research is most decidedly opposed to any attempt at separating off
homosexuals from the rest of mankind as a group of a special character . . . . psy-
cho-analysis considers that a choice of an object independently of its sex – freedom
to range equally over male and female objects – as it is found in childhood, in
primitive states of society and early periods of history, is the original basis from
which as a result of restriction in one direction or the other, both normal and the
inverted types develop.
(1905, pp. 144–146)
There is a normalizing trend in the focus on the specificity of object
choice. Later, in a similar vein (Freud, 1916–17), he writes of homosexuals
as a “class of perverts [who] behave to their sexual objects in approximately
the same way as normal people do to theirs” (pp. 307–308). Here Freud is
referring to homosexuals as a ‘class of perverts’, dropping the object rela-
tional term ‘invert’, keeping homosexuality within an umbrella identified as
perverse, but set aside, here, a different class, the behaviour is approxi-
mately the same as that of ‘normal people’.
He elaborates on the separation of object and aim in 1905, why it is that
he cannot specify a particular aim for homosexual relationships:
The important fact is that no one single aim can be laid down as applying in cases
of inversion. Among men, intercourse per anum by no means coincides with inver-
sion; masturbation is quite as frequently their exclusive aim, and it is even true that
restrictions of sexual aim – to the point of its being limited to simple outpourings
of emotion – are commoner among them than among heterosexual lovers. Amongst
women too, the aims of inverts are various.
(1905, pp. 145–146)
Freud acknowledges explicitly that homosexuality is a matter of “homo-
sexualities”. The variety here lies in the aims. In a footnote added in 1915,
he elaborates object choice and considers the sexual aim: “In inverted types,
a predominance of archaic constitutions and primitive psychical mechanisms
is regularly to be found. Their most essential characteristics seem to be a
coming into operation of narcissistic object-choice and a retention of the
erotic significance of the anal zone” (1905, p. 146). As for the “intercourse
per anum” and the “disgust which stamps that sexual aim as a perversion”,
Freud writes that
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people who try to account for this disgust by saying that the organ in question
serves the function of excretion and comes in contact with excrement – a thing
which is disgusting in itself – are not much more to the point than hysterical girls
who account for their disgust at the male genital by saying that it serves to void
urine. The playing of a sexual part by the mucous membrane of the anus is by no
means limited to intercourse between men; preference for it is in no way character-
istic of inverted feeling.
(1905, p. 152)
When inclusively documenting perversions in the Aberrations (Freud,
1905), he acknowledges a descending continuum, “Certain of them are so
far removed from the normal in their content that we cannot avoid
pronouncing them pathological” (1905, p. 161). And so he describes
paedophilia, necrophilia, sadomasochism, none of which are specifically
implicated in the inversions. Homosexuality is not regarded in this light as
pathological, although it is linked in the Three Essays with a developmental
failure, one amongst many arrests and inhibitions which complicate the evo-
lution towards adult heterosexuality (1905, p. 207).
He argues for a definition of perversion as less a matter of content than a
relation to the heterosexual intercourse that is the last step in a developmen-
tal process, and understood by him to be the crucial requirement for procre-
ation. Writing in a context in which he has explored the evidence for all
manner of perversions integrated into heterosexual life, he states that “if the
perversion has the characteristics of exclusiveness and fixation, then we shall
usually be justified in regarding it as a pathological symptom” (1905, p.
161). Not withstanding the “usually” which gently invokes the ambiguity so
frequently colouring this subject, homosexuality is by this definition patho-
logical in as much as it does not move toward heterosexual intercourse, and
does not subordinate the sexual drive to “the reproductive function”. The
failure to achieve adult heterosexuality is seen as a failure to “serve the aims
of reproduction” (1908, pp. 189–90), it is putting pleasure before the social
good, something which any “number of people are, on account of their
organization, not equal”. Whatever the variations in the inhibitions of an
achievement of adult heterosexuality, Freud’s definition of perversion usu-
ally turns on the aforementioned relationship to reproduction; “the aban-
donment of the reproductive function is the common feature of all
perversions. We actually describe a sexual activity as perverse if it has given
up the aim of reproduction and pursues the attainment of pleasure as an
aim independent of it” (1916–17, p. 316). The giving-up of the aim of repro-
duction becomes also a threat to the society which requires the services of
reproduction. The issue of homosexuality becomes a social issue, a problem
for society as a whole, which has reason to harness the powerful sexual
drives to the service of society, in the form of reproduction.
In the context in which he addresses this failure to reproduce, he writes of
groups of individuals whose ‘sexual life’ deviates in the most striking way from the
usual picture of the average. Some of these ‘perverse’ people have, we might say,
struck the distinction between the sexes off their programme . . . They are men and
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women who are often, though not always, irreproachably fashioned in other
respects, of high intellectual and ethical development, the victims only of this one
fatal deviation.
(1916–17, p. 304)
Inasmuch as he is entering into a discourse about contribution to the
social good, Freud writes of the contribution made by homosexuals to soci-
ety, implying a sublimation of the socially useful reproductive capacity, a
concern for the wider culture.
The capacity for reproduction of course only appears in adolescence, and
that is when according to Freud, in 1905, the achievement of adult sexuality
is accomplished, or not. Repeating the fundamental understanding of sexual
development established in 1905, Freud wrote at the very end of his life:
The complete organization [of the sexual function] is only achieved at puberty, in a
fourth, genital phase . . . This process is not always performed faultlessly. Inhibitions
in its development manifest themselves as the many sorts of disturbance in sexual life.
When this is so, we find fixations of the libido to conditions in earlier phases, whose
urge, which is independent of the normal sexual aim is described as perversion. One
such developmental inhibition, for instance, is homosexuality when it is manifest . . .
(1940, p. 155)
It is noticeable that Freud has moved here to include homosexuality with
perversions of sexual aim, and not kept it separate, as he had done in the
Three Essays and for many years after that (1905, 1909). By 1940, homosex-
uality has lost a bit of its protected status, and the aim as well as the object
has entered more clearly into the definition. At the same time, Freud
repeats the deference to social attitudes, writing of “fixations to conditions
in earlier phases . . . described as perversion” (1940, p. 155).
However, insistence that homosexual object choice is normal in origins,
that homosexual object choice is a fact of every infantile experience, does
not fade from Freud’s thinking, it is firm in 1915 when Freud added in
the famous footnote to the Three Essays, already quoted, affirming the
child’s “freedom to range equally over male and female objects” (1905, p.
145). Later, in 1925, he affirms: “The most important of these perversions,
homosexuality, scarcely deserves the name. It can be traced back to the
constitutional bisexuality of all human beings and to the after-affects of
the phallic primacy. Psychoanalysis enables us to point to some trace or
other of a homosexual object-choice in everyone” (1925b, p. 38). He never
stops reminding readers of the homosexual element in everyone: “In all of
us, throughout life, the libido normally oscillates between male and female
objects, the bachelor gives up his men friends when he marries and returns
to club life when married life has lost its savour” (1920, p. 158).
However, as he writes to the worried mother, famously quoted by Jones,
“Homosexuality is assuredly no advantage, but it is nothing to be ashamed
of, no vice, no degradation, it cannot be classified as an illness; we consider
it to be a variation of the sexual function produced of a certain arrest of
sexual development” (A letter from Freud to a Mother, 1935, in Jones,
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1957, p. 195). To the worried mother, he has referred to “a certain arrest of
sexual development”. The homosexual object choice remains harnessed to a
narcissism which precludes the movement into adult heterosexuality (1905,
pp. 144–145, footnote 1910) and the generative heterosexuality which is the
final developmental achievement and also the servant of social reproduc-
tion. The homosexual, who requires genitals of the same sex in his object,
whose sexuality is closer to narcissism and autoeroticism (1911, p. 61, 1916–
17, pp. 426–427) is precluded from the object choice understood as neces-
sary for the aims of reproduction.
Although the language of developmental arrest is sustained throughout
Freud’s writing, it is important to recall that, regarding the achievement of
a final normal sexuality, Freud remained circumspect. He has confirmed
that without social pressure, many more would adopt a homosexual posi-
tion (1905, pp. 229–30). And the path toward adult sexuality is rarely
straightforward. “We must reckon with the possibility that something in the
nature of the sexual instinct itself is unfavourable to the realization of com-
plete satisfaction.” He then names the factors, the diphasic onset of sexual-
ity, the interposition of the barrier against incest and the renunciation of
pleasures, particularly anal and sadistic, the price exacted by civilization
(1912, pp. 188–189)
As if to answer the question of what is so urgent and disturbing in the
discussion of homosexuality, particularly in thinking about normality and
pathology, Freud poses the question, late in his lifetime: Why is it that “A
man’s heterosexuality will not put up with any homosexuality, and vice
versa . . . there is no greater danger for a man’s heterosexual function than
its being disturbed by his latent homosexuality” Why is there an indepen-
dently emerging tendency to conflict? (1937, pp. 243–244). We leave his
exploration of this conflict to the next section of this paper, but think it
important to acknowledge in this conflict a source of difficulty informing
the enquiry into the normality and pathology of homosexuality, or by this
time, what we might acknowledge, the normalities and pathologies of
homosexualities. As a general rule, Freud takes the position that it is a phe-
nomena, like others to explore, and to illuminate through psychoanalysis,
when it is possible. “It is not for psycho-analysis to solve the problem of
homosexuality. It must rest content with disclosing the psychical mecha-
nisms that resulted in determining the object-choice, and with tracing back
the paths from them to the instinctual dispositions” (1920, p. 171).
The quantitative factor and free aggression or destructiveness
in relation to homosexuality
In the ‘Five Lectures on Psycho-analysis’ (Freud, 1910b) referring to the
constitutional bisexuality in every human being, Freud stated that “. . .every
child could be said to be gifted with a portion of homosexuality without
doing him injustice” (1910b, p. 44). In The Ego and the Id (Freud, 1923),
many years later, following the discussion of the complex development of
the oedipal situation which ends with an identification with one parent, tak-
ing the other, usually the other sex, as an object, he wrote “In both sexes
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the relative strength of the masculine and feminine dispositions . . . determi-
nes whether the outcome of the Oedipus situation shall be an identification
with the father or the mother (1923, p. 33). He is implying a quantitative
factor over and above the relationships in themselves, an innate quantity of
masculinity and femininity which influences the relationships and above all,
the identifications which mark the outcome of the Oedipus complex, both
positive and negative. The endowment is a priori preconflictual, and
informs the movement, finally, of the drives, the loves and hatreds, the
attachments and rivalries, the dialectics resulting in an adult sexual
orientation and a sexual identity which is only relatively stable. The quotas
of the bisexual endowment inform the struggle between positive and nega-
tive Oedipus, and in 1923, he writes that it “determines” heterosexual or
homosexual identifications.
In 1910, the same year as the ‘Five Lectures’ quoted above, and the same
year as Freud made a study of Leonardo, he added a footnote to the Three
Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, adding consideration of a dynamic but
also quantitative element, stating the “future inverts . . . pass through a
phase of very intense but short lived fixation to a woman” (1905, p. 145).
This intense passion is given up, and an object choice is made on a narcis-
sistic basis, as described in this paper in the section ‘Narcissism and object
choice, narcissism and identification’. Freud does not hypothesize the cause
of this move, other than acknowledging in the passionate intensity, a quan-
titative element, implying that the homosexual movement is away from an
intensity that is short lived, is too intense, the combination of arousal and
helplessness, by implication, too difficult to contain. The subject puts him-
self into the role of the parent, the mother, and gains some mastery over
the situation of dependency. It is, as discussed elsewhere, a narcissistic solu-
tion to an early anxiety situation.
In ‘Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexual-
ity’ (1922), Freud looks directly at the role not of excessive love or attach-
ment to a primary object, but to the function of aggression arising out of
the attachment, and its influence in the development of homosexual object
choice, again, in the male. He writes of “early impulses of jealousy, derived
from the mother-complex and of very great intensity” (1922, p. 231) which
arise in the boy, against rivals, other boys, admired by the mother, leading
to powerful, overwhelming death wishes against the rivals. “Under the
influence of upbringing – and certainly not uninfluenced also by their con-
tinuing powerlessness – these impulses yielded to repression and underwent
a transformation so that the rivals of the earlier period became the first
homosexual love-objects” (1922, p. 231). The object of a hatred of “very
great intensity” becomes an object of desire, by inference, a required object,
a necessary confirmation of the failure of the aggression to destroy the for-
mer rival, or for that matter, to be destroyed in turn. The transformation of
hate into love in a triangular situation could equally describe an oedipal
event. The point we wish to emphasize here is how strikingly the quantita-
tive factor is included in Freud’s understanding of processes leading to
homosexual object choice. An emotional situation of “continuing powerless-
ness” implicit in the situation of the child, the experience of helplessness
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before a quantity of aroused affectivity “of very great intensity”, in excess
of the psychic capacity to bring about satisfaction or containment drives a
psychic shift, a transformation of hate into love. Examining further this
move from hate to love in The Ego and the Id (1923), Freud hypothesizes
the expediency of this shift, the opportunity for discharge, the greater “pro-
spect of satisfaction” if there is a shift in the direction of love (1923, p. 44).
In the process described in 1922, it becomes imperative that the object is
the same sex, whereby the intensity of rivalry for the maternal object is
overcome. He links this move with fear of castration in relation to the
father as well as the move away from rivalry with a boy. The withdrawal
from a rivalry with the father, and therefore from the danger of castration,
relieves the narcissistic vulnerability derived from again, a quota “of quite
exceptional strength” which is the “high value set upon the male organ
(1922, p. 230). In both this version of a homosexual evolution, where exces-
sive rivalry and hostility drives a conversion of hate and fear into love, and
the homosexual evolution posited, as in the case of Leonardo (Freud,
1910a), where an excessive intensity of love in relation to the mother
becomes a less threatening love for an object mirroring the self, the move
toward the homosexual object choice is understood as a solution to an
experience of being psychically overwhelmed, either by too much love, or
by too much hate.
Although Freud was always concerned with the emotional history of
hatred, and the evidence of sadism in erotic life, the focus became more
pronounced in the years after 1920 and the introduction of the death drive,
a concept which he maintained up to the end of his working life: “There is
so often associated with the erotic relationship, over and above its own
sadistic components, a quota of plain inclination to aggression” (1930, p.
106). An inclination to aggression had been identified in The Ego and the
Id (1923) in which Freud hypothesized an element of aggression left over
after the ego manages to give up its objects. In the giving up of the erotic
attachment which is followed by an identification, there is, he says, always
something left over, “free aggression”, described as a quantity of aggression
circulating in the psyche, and not bound by sublimation or identification
or an object relation. Writing of the formation of the super-ego, he states
that
Every such identification is in the nature of a desexualization or even a sublima-
tion. It now seems as though when a transformation of this kind takes place, an
instinctual defusion occurs at the same time. After sublimation the erotic compo-
nent no longer has the power to bind the whole of destructiveness that was com-
bined with it, and this is released in the form of an inclination to aggression and
destruction.
(1923, p. 54)
In this comment on the process of identification in the formation of the
superego, we see Freud disclosing a quantitative conceptualization which
has some bearing on the development of erotic life, implying here that the
repression of gratification involved in the development of sexual identifica-
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tions and the establishment of the super ego, fundamentally, the oedipal
task, always leaves some aggression free. At the same time, he again notes
that the most efficient binder of quantities of aggression in the psyche is the
erotic drive, which he illustrated in the 1922 paper (‘Some Neurotic Mecha-
nisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality’) with an explanation for
the development of a homosexual object choice. Some potential back and
forth between identification and the attempted binding of the left-over
aggression with renewed erotization might be drawn from this conceptual-
ization.
Still later, Freud hypothesized the impact of quantities of aggression, or
destructiveness or death drive, in the intrapsychic conflict between homosex-
uality and heterosexuality. Writing in Analysis Terminable and Interminable
(1937), Freud ponders once again the issue of bisexuality, here within a con-
text of conflict, informed by the wider consideration of the death instinct,
or destructiveness, and its role in creating difficulties in the therapeutic suc-
cess of psychoanalysis:
At all periods there have been, as there still are, people who can take as their sexual
objects members of their own sex as well as the opposite one without the one trend
interfering with the other. We call such people bisexuals, and we accept their exis-
tence without feeling much surprise about it. We have come to learn, however, that
every human being is bisexual in this sense. But we are struck by the following
point. Whereas in the first class of people the two trends have got on together with-
out clashing, in the second and more numerous class, they are in a state of irrecon-
cilable conflict. A man’s heterosexuality will not put up with any homosexuality,
and vice versa . . . there is no greater danger for a man’s heterosexual function than
its being disturbed by his latent homosexuality. We might attempt to explain this
by saying that each individual only has a certain quota of libido at his disposal, for
which the two rival trends have to struggle. But it is not clear why the rivals do not
always divide up the available quota of libido between them according to their rela-
tive strength, since they are able to do so in a number of cases. We are forced to
the conclusion that the tendency to a conflict is something special, something which
is newly added to the situation, irrespective of the quantity of libido. An indepen-
dently emerging tendency to conflict of this sort can scarcely be attributed to any-
thing but the intervention of an element of free aggressiveness.
(1937, p. 244)
Freud here discloses the impact of aggression informing every sexual
development, any compromise, conflict or integration of the bisexual dispo-
sition. Present from the start, the bisexuality will be susceptible to the influ-
ence of aggression. The presence of that aggression will not only inform
both the nature of any individual’s sexuality, and include a resistance to a
psychoanalytic treatment, it will also inform any discussion of homosexual-
ity. As Freud has made clear from the beginning of his discussion of sexual
development, the cost of the demands of civilization, which favours the
development of a life engendering heterosexuality, is high. His last formula-
tions note that the death drive will inform that development. And he has
shown elsewhere that the demands of development itself, including the
renunciations and identifications of the oedipal conflict, will give rise to
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more or less free aggression, which in turn will inform the outcome of that
sexual development. The project of binding both the innate aggression and
the aggression which is a result of the civilizing renunciations required to
live in society, to face the oedipal conflict, is a difficult task, as Freud
acknowledged in 1905, and continued to elaborate and explore up until his
last years. He never rested content that he had fathomed the problem com-
pletely which he acknowledged, with an air of melancholy in Civilization
and its Discontents, as we have recalled earlier in this paper:
The sexual life of civilized man . . . sometimes gives the impression of being in pro-
cess of involution as a function, just as our teeth and hair seem to be as organs . . .
Sometimes one seems to perceive that it is not only civilization but something in
the nature of the function itself which denies us full satisfaction and urges us along
other paths. This may be wrong, it is hard to decide.
(1930, p. 105)
In conclusion
Freud offers no comfort to the wish for a black and white clarity on the
subject of the normality or pathology of homosexuality. He is, throughout
his life, clear that we are all born with bisexual endowment, albeit differ-
ently endowed, and all have been homosexual in infancy and childhood,
which homosexuality lives on in the unconscious life of the adult. He is also
clear that the route to adult heterosexuality is complex, full of hurdles, and
that it is enforced, sometimes brutally, by the demands of civilization, the
pressure to reproduce essential to the continuity of society. Without social
pressure, he confirms, there would be much more homosexuality. The
retreat from or rebellion against this pressure, is expressed in the homosexu-
ality he never stopped regarding as developmentally closer to narcissism
and autoeroticism than is heterosexual object choice. Although he explored
several routes to homosexual object choice, he was clear that there are
many, and from very early, he confirmed that there are many different
forms of homosexual object love (Freud, 1905). He was, in this, the first
psychoanalytic author to confirm the existence of homosexualities.
Threaded throughout his explorations of homosexualities and heterosexu-
alities and certainly gaining in importance in later writing, is the role of
aggression. At first hypothesizing the threat of the demands of too much
love as a determiner of homosexual object choice (Freud, 1910a), he later
notes the equally overwhelming problem of too much hate, leading to a
homosexual object choice aimed specifically at transforming hatred into
libido, a narcissistic solution to an unbearable intensity of rivalry (Freud,
1922). In the Ego and the Id (1923), considering the multiple identifications
resulting from an Oedipus complex driven by experience but informed or
even determined by bisexual endowment, he notes that there is a quantity
of aggression left unbound in every renunciation, every developmental step
towards sexual individuation. And in his last consideration of the internal
conflict that often rages between the heterosexual and homosexual aspects
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within the same individual, he hypothesizes the role of “free aggression”
informing this conflict, destructiveness identified with the death instinct,
colouring the internal conflict (Freud, 1937).
The presence of that destructive drive not only informs the nature of any
individual’s sexuality but also informs any discussion of homosexuality.
Recognition of its presence may help us to understand the vehemence of
some of these discussions, within the psychoanalytic community as well as
outside, where homophobia is often accompanied by murderous attitudes,
overt or covert. Freud challenges us continually to maintain a humility
along with a scientific curiosity in exploring the complex subject, mindful of
contextual pressures always impinging on research, or interwoven in the
results of that research.
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